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Abstract
Two of the most difficult problems in the philosophical foundations of
physics are (1) what gives rise to the arrow of time and (2) what the ontology
of quantum mechanics is. The first problem is puzzling since the fundamen-
tal dynamical laws of physics do not include an arrow of time. The second
problem is puzzling since the quantum-mechanical wave function describes a
non-separable reality that is remarkably different from the objects in our ordi-
nary experiences.
In this paper, we propose a unified “Humean” solution to the two problems.
Humeanism allows us to incorporate the Past Hypothesis and the Statistical
Postulate into the best system, which we then use to simplify the quantum
state of the universe. This allows us to confer the nomological status to the
quantum state in a way that adds no significant complexity to the best system
and solves the “supervenient-kind problem” facing the original version of the
Past Hypothesis. We call this strategy the Humean unification. It brings together
the origins of time asymmetry and quantum entanglement. On this theory,
what gives rise to the arrow of time is also responsible for the non-separable
phenomena in nature. The result is a more unified theory, with a separable mo-
saic, a best system that is simple and non-vague, less tension between quantum
mechanics and special relativity, and more theoretical and dynamical unity. We
then compare our proposals to those in the literature that focus on only one
of the two problems. Our analysis further suggests that, in order to obtain a
deeper understanding about the problems in philosophy of science, it can be
tremendously illuminating to explore the full resources of Humeanism, even if
one is not a Humean.
Keywords: arrows of time, quantum entanglement, wave function, density matrix,
Humean supervenience, laws of nature, Best System Account, the Past Hypothesis, Statisti-
cal Postulate, the Mentaculus, objective probabilities, separability, narratability, vagueness,
Lorentz invariance
*Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr, La Jolla, CA
92093-0119. Website: www.eddykemingchen.net. Email: eddykemingchen@ucsd.edu
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
05
02
9v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.h
ist
-p
h]
  9
 Ju
n 2
02
0
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Problems of Time Asymmetry and Quantum Entanglement 4
2.1 The Original Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Relevance to Humeanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Towards A New Theory 9
3.1 The Mentaculus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2 The Wentaculus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2.1 Density Matrix Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2.2 The Initial Projection Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4 The Humean Unification 19
4.1 The Nomological Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 A Unified Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3 New Wrinkles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 Fruits of Humean Unification 26
5.1 The Mosaic: Simpler, Separable, and Narratable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2 The Best System: Simpler, Less Vague, and More Unified . . . . . . . . 28
6 Comparisons 30
6.1 Wave Function Humeanism in a High-Dimensional Space . . . . . . . . 30
6.2 Wave Function Humeanism in a Low-Dimensional Space . . . . . . . . 30
7 Conclusion 32
1 Introduction
Two of the most puzzling phenomena in nature are time asymmetry and quantum
entanglement. They have played important roles in the development of contempo-
rary physics. The study of time asymmetry started a rigorous discipline of statistical
mechanics with applications to many domains. The study of quantum entangle-
ment produced profound insights about the foundations of quantum mechanics, as
well as potential technological advances in quantum information and cryptography.
In philosophy of science, both problems are treated as useful data for evalu-
ating leading theories about laws, chances, and ontology. They frequently come
up in debates about Humeanism vs. anti-Humeanism in the metaphysics of sci-
ence, serving as important case studies regarding questions such as whether the
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fundamental ontology is separable, whether laws supervene on the material ontol-
ogy, and whether we should allow fundamental laws about initial conditions and
“deterministic chances.”
So far, however, they have largely been treated as distinct and unrelated problems
in the foundations of physics and philosophy of science. Humeans have offered
ingenious solutions to them by conferring nomological status to the Past Hypothesis,
a promising explanation for the arrow of time in our patch of the universe, and
(recently) to the quantum wave function, which is responsible for the phenomena of
quantum entanglement. However, conferring nomological status is not always easy
and could lead to tensions with other things Humeans may believe about laws of
nature. For example, can the Past Hypothesis be a fundamental (Humean) law even
if it is stated in a non-fundamental language, as an infinitely long disjunction, or with
vague terms? Can the wave function be considered nomological if it is extremely
complex and perhaps more complex than the mosaic it aims to summarize? There
have been proposed answers but they seem to require further modifications of the
Humean framework, which may not be fully satisfactory.
The purpose of this paper is to focus on some interconnections between the two
problems and show that they are deeply related such as to permit a unified treatment
in the Humean framework. The unification in the Humean framework shows that
what is responsible for time’s arrow can also be responsible for the non-separable
phenomena in nature. We do this by adopting a new theory of quantum statistical
mechanics and using the nomological status of the Past Hypothesis to select a natural
initial quantum state of the universe and to argue for its nomological status. We call
the general strategy the Humean unification. We show that it leads to not only novel
solutions to both problems but also new insights about the relationship between
Humeanism and foundations of physics. Humean unification suggests that, in order
to obtain a deeper understanding about the problems in philosophy of science, it
can be tremendously illuminating to explore the full resources of Humeanism, even
if one is not a Humean.
We proceed as follows. In §2, we review the problems of time asymmetry and
quantum entanglement in more details and discuss their relevance to the Humean
framework. In §3, we review the Mentaculus theory, a promising and concrete
theory of quantum statistical mechanics, and we construct a new theory called the
Wentaculus that makes central use of density matrices and a new law called the Initial
Projection Hypothesis that replaces the Past Hypothesis. In §4, we “Humeanize” the
Wentaculus by arguing that the initial quantum state of the universe described
by the Initial Projection Hypothesis can be interpreted nomologically rather than
ontologically, which leads to a unified treatment of time asymmetry and quantum
entanglement. In §5, we discuss the fruits of Humean unification. In §6, we compare
and contrast Humean unification to other related proposals that focus on only one
of the two problems.1
1In this paper, we make use of ideas and methods from the metaphysics of science, philosophy of
physics, and mathematical physics. We do not worry too much about whether the ideas are purely
philosophical or scientific. A precise disciplinary boundary here may be difficult to draw. Indeed,
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The issues we discuss here have ramifications that go beyond the plausibility of
Humeanism. By choosing a natural initial quantum state, our theory provides novel
insights about the foundations of quantum statistical mechanics. The new quantum
theories admit a Humean interpretation, but I believe that they are also compatible
with a non-Humean interpretation. I discuss this possibility in §7.2
2 Problems of Time Asymmetry and Quantum Entanglement
2.1 The Original Problems
In this section, we discuss the original problems of time asymmetry and quantum
entanglement (A and B) as well as further problems they give birth to (A1-2 and
B1-2).
The first problem can be stated as follows:
A. The Problem of Time Asymmetry: Why is there temporal asymmetry in the
world when the fundamental dynamical laws are symmetric in time?
Time asymmetry is widespread in nature: ice cubes melt in a cup of hot water but
do not spontaneously form in it; gas expands in a box but does not spontaneously
contract; wine glasses break into pieces but the broken pieces do not spontaneously
form wine glasses. In the language of thermodynamics, (isolated) physical sys-
tems (typically) evolve from states of lower entropy to states of higher entropy;
but not the other way around. The phenomena are summarized by the Second
Law of Thermodynamics: (isolated) physical systems (typically) do not decrease in
entropy. However, the fundamental dynamical laws of physics, such as the Newto-
nian equation of motion, the Schrödinger equation, the Dirac equation, and Einstein
field equations are (essentially) symmetric in time. They allow ice cubes to decrease
in size and to increase in size, gas molecules to expand and to contract, and wine
glasses to break into pieces and the pieces spontaneously form glasses. They allow
(isolated) physical systems to increase in entropy as well as to decrease in entropy.
It has been argued that the origin of time asymmetry in our universe lies in a
low-entropy boundary condition, now called the Past Hypothesis.3 According to the
Past Hypothesis, the universe “started” in a state of extremely low entropy. Starting
from that state, most likely the universe will evolve according to the fundamental
physical laws into higher entropy states, giving rise to the temporal asymmetry
we observe. We add the probabilistic qualifier “most likely” because there exist
we welcome the possibility that some ideas in philosophy may lead to new theoretical possibilities
in foundations of physics and vice versa.
2This paper is the second part of a project called “Time’s Arrow in a Quantum Universe.” For
other related papers in the project, see Chen (2018a,b, 2019a) and Chen (2020).
3Albert (2000) coins the term. See Feynman (2017), Goldstein (2001), Lebowitz (2008), Ehrenfest
and Ehrenfest (2002), North (2011), and Penrose (1979) for more discussions about the low-entropy
initial condition. See Earman (2006) for worries about the Past Hypothesis. See Goldstein et al.
(2016) for a discussion about the possibility, and some recent examples, of explaining the arrow of
time without the Past Hypothesis.
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some initial conditions compatible with the Past Hypothesis that will go to lower-
entropy states in the future. To provide a reason for neglecting those anti-entropic
states, we add a uniform probability distribution to make them extremely unlikely.
That distribution is specified by the Statistical Postulate. Loewer (2012) dubs the
package of postulates—the dynamical laws, the Past Hypothesis, and the Statistical
Postulate—the Mentaculus.
However, the Past Hypothesis and the Statistical Postulate give rise to difficult
conceptual issues. Since they play a crucial role in explaining time asymmetry and
the Second Law, and since they are incredibly simple, it has been argued that the Past
Hypothesis is a fundamental law of nature4 and the Statistical Postulate provides
objective probabilities. But how can the Past Hypothesis be a law of nature if it is a
(macroscopic) boundary condition? And how can the initial probability distribution
be objective if the laws are deterministic?
A1. The Status of the Past Hypothesis: How can the Past Hypothesis be a funda-
mental law of nature if it is a (macroscopic) boundary condition?
A2. The Status of the Statistical Postulate: How can the initial probability distri-
bution be objective if the laws are deterministic?
The second and seemingly unrelated problem is as follows:
B. The Problem of Quantum Entanglement: What is the nature of quantum entan-
glement?
Quantum mechanics is one of the most empirically successful theories. But it
presents numerous conceptual puzzles. At the heart of them is the phenomenon
of quantum entanglement. Quantum entanglement is a property of the quantum
state, which is standardly represented by a wave function ψ. Two systems A and B
are entangled when their joint state ψAB is not a product of their individual states
ψA and ψB. We have good reasons to be realist about quantum mechanics and
about the quantum state.5 So we may have to postulate the quantum state in the
world. If it is fundamental, then the fundamental ontology would be non-separable:
the fundamental state of the world is not determined by the states of its parts.
Quantum entanglement is a kind of holism.6 However, this is not the only surprising
consequence of quantum entanglement. David Albert (2015) has shown that if
quantum entanglement is among the fundamental facts, i.e. in the mosaic, then
Lorentz invariance of special relativity would conflict with a very natural principle
called narratability: the full history of the world can be narrated in a single temporal
sequence, and other ways of narrating it will be its geometrical transformations (e.g.
4 Suggestions that the Past Hypothesis is an additional law of nature can be found in Feynman
(2017), Albert (2000), Goldstein (2001), Callender (2004), and Loewer (2012). The inference that the
Past Hypothesis may be a fundamental law is based on the fact that it does not seem to be derived
from anything else. In this paper, we set aside the interesting possibility raised by Carroll and Chen
(2004).
5See Chen (2019b) for a survey of the realist proposals.
6See Miller (2016) for more discussions about the notion of holism here.
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by Lorentz transformations). The conflict could be a problem for Everettian (and
some GRW-type) theories that aspire to be (fully) Lorentz invariant.
B1. The Problem of Non-Separability: The state of the world is not determined
by the states of its parts.
B2. The Conflict between Lorentz Invariance and Narratability: If quantum
entanglement is in the mosaic, then Lorentz invariance conflicts with narrata-
bility.
2.2 Relevance to Humeanism
The problem of time asymmetry and the problem of quantum entanglement have
been much discussed in foundations of physics and metaphysics of science. Both
problems have come up when evaluating Humeanism: the first problem has been
used to support Humeanism and the second one against Humeanism. Each of them
has also inspired much interesting, original, and insightful work about the Humean
framework in the metaphysics of science. These include: Loewer (1996), Cohen and
Callender (2009), Callender and Cohen (2010), Miller (2013), Esfeld (2014), Bhogal
and Perry (2015), Callender (2015), Albert (2015), Miller (2016), Esfeld and Deckert
(2017).
So far, the two problems have been treated as distinct problems. We have
seen impressive progress in developing interesting solutions to these two problems.
Interestingly, the solutions both have something to do with laws of nature. However,
the solutions not fully satisfactory. I will discuss some prima facie problems below.
The Humean framework in the metaphysics of science can be roughly character-
ized by the following theses:
• Humean Mosaic: the fundamental physical ontology is a separable mosaic. In
the terminology of Lewis (1986), it consists in “local matter of particular fact.”
• Best System Account of Lawhood: the fundamental laws are the axioms of the
summary that best balances a host of theoretical virtues such as simplicity and
strength.
Humean supervenience is the thesis that all there is is a Humean mosaic consisting
of local matter of particular fact and all else supervenes on that. Loewer (2001, 2004)
suggests that we should allow the best system to admit objective probabilities even
when the laws are deterministic, so long as admitting them makes the system more
informative without adding too much complexity. This is an important modification
of the original Humean framework, but it is arguably continuous with the Mill-
Ramsey-Lewis account. Given the success of statistical mechanics, it also represents
an important advancement in our understanding of objective probabilities that play
a central role in physics.7 For the rest of this paper, I will adopt the modified Humean
framework as the starting point to think about Humeanism.
7For a different perspective, see Schaffer (2007).
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On the one hand, in response to the problem of time asymmetry, it has been
argued8 that the (modified) Humean framework can solve the problem and the
worries raised in A1 and A2. It is highly plausible that the Past Hypothesis and
the Statistical Postulate belong to the Humean best summary, as they vastly in-
crease the informativeness of the system without adding much complexity. This is
true despite the fact that the Past Hypothesis describes a boundary condition and
the fundamental dynamical laws may be deterministic. Hence, on the (modified)
Humean account, the Past Hypothesis (PH) and the Statistical Postulate (SP) are as
nomic as the dynamical equations of motion.
However, new problems arise as we consider the character of the two new
Humean laws. For PH, there is a language problem.9 Adapting the terminology of
Cohen and Callender (2009), we can call it the “supervenient-kind problem”: terms
such as entropy is obviously not fundamental, and as such PH may not be fit to be
a fundamental law if the axioms of the best system require the vocabulary to be entirely in
fundamental physical terms.10 They note that if we flesh out “low entropy” in terms
of the microlanguage, it will be an infinitely long disjunction of microstates which
does not seem to be simple at all. (The supervenient-kind problem is part of the
motivation for “language-relativization” in the Better Best System Account, which
is arguably a radical departure from the original Humean framework.)
In fact, the situation may be even worse: not only is an infinite disjunction
probably too long to be an axiom of the best system, but also are the macroscopic
terms such as entropy unlikely to correspond to exactly one set of disjuncts.11 Given
the inherent vagueness in the bridge between the macroscopic and the microscopic,
it is plausible that there will be borderline cases of whether some microstates fall
under the allowed range of states dictated by the Past Hypothesis. Macrostates
have vague boundaries. Any precise boundary would seem artificial and arbitrary.
To be sure, these problems do not refute the Humean understanding of the Past
Hypothesis, but they seem to suggest that it may be premature to marry the Humean
framework to something like the Mentaculus. Hence, Humeanism initially seemed
friendly to treating the Past Hypothesis as a law, but upon closer inspection there
are deep and difficult problems about language.
For SP, the Humean solution treats it as objective as with the postulates of
quantum-mechanical probabilities. It would be desirable if we can unify the two or
8See, for example, Callender (2004) and Loewer (2012).
9Some may respond that we can just replace the PH and SP by specifying a single probability
distribution on the state space that does not suffer from the language problem described here. But
it is plausible that, in the standard framework, the simplest way to specify SP is to first specify the
initial macrostate (using something like PH) which will then serve as the “support” of the probability
distribution. Nevertheless, new possibilities will be available in the Wentaculus framework. But we
are getting ahead of ourselves.
10This is essentially Lewis’s insistence that the terms of the best system must refer to “perfectly
natural properties,” or the fundamental properties picked out by fundamental physics. See Sider
(2011) for a similar proposal for “structural” and “joint-carving” properties. What these amount to
and whether this requirement is tenable is a controversial issue. But it is important to note that such
properties play an important role in response to the “problem of the (x)Fx” and the new riddle of
induction.
11I discuss this point more systematically in Chen (2020).
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reduce one to the other.
On the other hand, the problem of quantum entanglement is prima facie threat-
ening to Humeanism. First, Teller (1986) and Maudlin (2007) suggest that B1 is
a problem for Humeanism, as the entanglement relations would make the mo-
saic non-separable. Second, if we would like to keep Lorentz invariance (e.g. for
Everettian theories) in a non-separable mosaic, we would have to sacrifice narrata-
bility. This is undesirable. Since Lorentz transformations does not fully preserve
the quantum-mechanical data as argued by Albert, in order to tell the story of the
mosaic in a temporal sequence, we would have to specify the quantum state not just
along one foliation but along all foliations of space-like hypersurfaces. Describing
the Humean mosaic temporally will become infinitely more complex—a potentially
undesirable result.
A promising response to B1 is also a “nomic” strategy: it recommends that
Humeans allow the quantum state (represented by a wave function) into the best
system. In quantum theories with additional ontologies beyond the quantum state
(such as Bohmian mechanics, GRW spontaneous collapse theories with a matter
density ontology or a flash ontology, and Everettian quantum theory with a matter
density ontology), it may be tempting to think that the quantum state is part of the
summary of the local ontology consisting in particles, matter density, or flashes in
physical space. However, the quantum state may be too complex to be nomological.
In fact, the typical quantum wave function is highly complex as a function on
configuration space. In response to the complexity worry, one may follow Dürr
et al. (1996), Goldstein and Teufel (2001), Goldstein and Zanghì (2013) to connect the
nomological interpretation to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation in quantum gravity. As
a solution to that equation, the universal wave function must be time-independent
and thus may be simple. But for Humeanism, it seems premature to tie its tenability
to a particular idea in quantum gravity, especially when it is not clear whether the
Wheeler-DeWitt equation will survive future development in quantum gravity. (It
has yet to play a central role in string theory.)
These concerns with the nomological interpretation of the wave function are
by no means decisive refutations, but they suggest that we may need to think
outside the box and look for other ways to solve the problems that avoid the above
issues. Nevertheless, the nomological interpretation seems promising and on the
right track, especially since a successful nomological interpretation can solve both
problems—B1 and B2—at the same time. If the entanglement relations are not in the
mosaic, then it can satisfy separability, narratability, as well as Lorentz invariance
(for theories with such an aspiration). This is in contrast to the interesting proposal
of the high-dimensional Humean interpretation of the wave function developed by
Loewer (1996).
The treatments of the two problems are so far largely unrelated to each other. In
the next three sections, we discuss some important connections between the two.
The Humean unification will take advantage of their connections. We use the Past
Hypothesis to simplify the quantum state (by choosing a natural, simple, unique,
objective, but mixed quantum state), so that we can find solutions to both B1 and B2
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without making the law system overly complex . We then use the chosen quantum
state to connect the initial low-entropy macrostate to the microdynamics, providing
a solution to the supervenient-kind problem and the vagueness problem.
3 Towards A New Theory
In this section, I first review the standard account of quantum mechanics in a time
asymmetric universe. For concreteness, we focus on the quantum Mentaculus, a
neo-Boltzmannian account of quantum statistical mechanics. Next, I propose an
alternative account called the Wentaculus. It replaces the universal wave function
with a (mixed-state) universal density matrix, the pure-state dynamics with mixed-
state dynamics, and the Past Hypothesis with the Initial Projection Hypothesis. Here
I focus on the conceptual ideas as much as possible, leaving most mathematical
details to the footnotes.
3.1 The Mentaculus
Understanding the world we live in requires us to understand all the regularities
in nature. As we discussed in §2, many regularities we are familiar with, such as
ice melting, smoke dispersing, and face getting more wrinkled with time, are time-
asymmetric. A large class of these time-asymmetric phenomena can be understood
as entropic asymmetries in time: the past events have lower entropies than future
events. To give a full account of entropic asymmetries of time in terms of scientific
explanations, we can postulate some low-entropy boundary conditions and prob-
ability distributions beyond the fundamental dynamical equations. The field of
statistical mechanics has devoted considerable energy in justifying the conjecture
that something like a low-entropy initial condition (together with some probability
distributions) will lead to a typical monotonic increase in entropy. For concreteness,
we can focus on one particular proposal of Albert (2000), Loewer (2012), and Loewer
(2016):
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The Classical Mentaculus
1. Fundamental Dynamical Laws (FDL): the classical microstate of the
universe is represented by a point in phase spacea (encoding the positions
and momenta of all particles in the universe) that obeys F = ma.
2. The Past Hypothesis (PH): at a temporal boundary of the universe, the
microstate of the universe lies inside M0, a low-entropy macrostate that,
given a choice of C-parameters,b corresponds to a small-volume set of
points on phase space that are macroscopically similar.
3. The Statistical Postulate (SP): given the macrostate M0, we postulate a
uniform probability distributionc over the microstates compatible with
M0.
aThe phase space is the 6N-dimensional state space for a classical system with N point
particles with precise locations and velocities in physical space.
bThe C-parameters are certain conventional choices—the coarse-graining variables—that
connect the macrostates to sets of microstates.
cThe uniform probability distribution here is with respect to the canonical Lebesgue mea-
sure on phase space.
This is the classical-mechanical version of the Mentaculus theory. It is a version
of the neo-Boltzmannian account of classical statistical mechanics. However, it is a
pretty strong version as it specifies a particular low-entropy macrostate M0 and a
particular probability distribution (the uniform one). The detailed differences do not
matter here. Most theorems and conjectures in statistical mechanics apply to it just as
well as they apply to weaker versions of the PH and SP. We chose the Mentaculus not
to commit ourselves to it but merely to write it down as a (concrete) representative
of a standard way of thinking about time’s arrow in a classical universe.
Next, we move to quantum statistical mechanics. Let us consider how to ex-
tend the classical Mentaculus to the quantum version. The key will be to replace
the classical state space (phase space) with the quantum state space—the Hilbert
space—and to reformulate Boltzmannian statistical mechanics in terms of resources
in Hilbert space. Here we can follow the suggestions of Albert (2000)§7 and the
mathematical framework of Goldstein et al. (2010a).
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The Quantum Mentaculus
1. Fundamental Dynamical Laws (FDL): the quantum microstate of the
universe is represented by a wave function Ψ that obeys the Schrödinger
equation ih̵∂ψ∂t = Hˆψ.
2. The Past Hypothesis (PH): at a temporal boundary of the universe, the
wave function Ψ0 of the universe lies inside a low-entropy macrostate
that, given a choice of C-parameters,a corresponds to HPH, a low-
dimensional subspace of the total Hilbert space.
3. The Statistical Postulate (SP): given the subspace HPH, we postulate
a uniform probability distributionb over the wave functions compatible
withHPH.
aIn addition to the ones mentioned in the classical Mentaculus, the C-parameters here
also include conventional choices about the cut-off threshold of quantum state macrostate
inclusion.
bThe uniform probability distribution is with respect to the surface area measure on the
unit sphere ofHPH.
The quantum Mentaculus is a concrete version of a standard way of thinking
about time’s arrow in a quantum universe. Given this setup, the aim is to show
that typical universal wave functions compatible with these postulates will evolve
in such a way that most subsystems increase in entropy. There has been impressive
results that are highly suggestive along this direction.12
Let us provide some explanations of the quantum Mentaculus. First, the quan-
tum microstate of the universe is represented by a wave function Ψ. It corresponds
to a unit-length vector in Hilbert space. The Hilbert space is an infinite dimensional
state space for quantum theory. But a slightly more perspicuous picture of the
wave function is to think of it as a function on the configuration space R3N. The
configuration space is analogous to the phase space in classical mechanics except
that it has only 3N dimensions instead of 6N dimensions (where N is the number
of particles in the universe), and each point in the configuration space represents
a possible configuration of particles in physical space in terms of their locations
only. The wave function assigns values to every point in configuration space. How
to interpret the wave function is a central question in the foundations of quantum
mechanics.
But even before we engage in the philosophical questions about the interpreta-
tion of the wave function, it is important to realize there is a scientific question at
the heart of quantum theory: what is the dynamics of quantum mechanics? The
wave function changes over time and obeys the Schrödinger equation. Since the
wave functions can superpose into other wave functions, and since the Schrödinger
equation is linear, we encounter the notorious quantum measurement problem, about
which we will return to shortly.
12For example, see Goldstein et al. (2010b).
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Second, to account for the temporal asymmetry of entropy, we introduce a low-
entropy boundary condition—the Past Hypothesis (PH). It rules out the overwhelm-
ing majority of initial wave functions in the Hilbert space, leaving a small class of
wave functions that will start in low entropy states. The actual initial wave function
has to come from a particular subspace HPH of the total Hilbert space. The Past
Hypothesis subspace HPH has very low entropy. In classical statistical mechanics,
Boltzmann defines entropy of a phase point to be proportional to the logarithm of
the volume of the macrostate that includes the phase point. Analogously, the Boltz-
mann entropy of a wave function is proportional to the logarithm of the dimension
of the subspace it (almost entirely) belongs.13 Hence, HPH is a low-dimensional
subspace. By comparison, PH for classical statistical mechanics postulates that the
initial phase point lies inside a macrostate of very small volume.
Third, to make it overwhelmingly likely that the initial wave function is entropic,
i.e. evolves to higher-entropy states, we introduce the quantum version of the
Statistical Postulate (SP). It provides a uniform probability distribution over the
initial wave functions in the subspace. Because of time-reversal invariance, it is
plausible that there exist an infinity of “bad” wave functions that are anti-entropic
(i.e. evolve to lower entropy). But the uniform probability distribution assigns much
lower weight on them than on the entropic wave functions.14 By comparison, SP in
classical statistical mechanics is a uniform probability distribution on the classical
phase points compatible with the Past Hypothesis.
These three postulates make up the quantum version of the Mentaculus. How-
ever, the Mentaculus cannot be the entire story of quantum mechanics in a time
asymmetric universe. As we mentioned before, quantum mechanics itself faces the
measurement problem. It seems that the Schrödinger evolution of the wave func-
tion is interrupted by sudden collapses. The wave function typically evolves into
superpositions of macrostates, such as the cat being alive and the cat being dead.
This can be represented by wave functions on the configuration space with disjoint
macroscopic supports X and Y. During measurements, which are not precisely
defined processes in the standard theory, the wave function undergoes random col-
lapses. The probability that it collapses into any particular macrostate X is given by
the Born rule.15
As such, quantum mechanics is not a candidate for a fundamental physical
theory. It has two dynamical laws: the deterministic Schrödinger equation and the
indeterministic collapse rule. What are the conditions for applying the former, and
what are the conditions for applying the latter? Measurements and observations
are extremely vague concepts. Take a concrete experimental apparatus for example.
When should we treat it as part of the quantum system that evolves linearly and
when should we treat it as an “observer,” i.e. something that stands outside the
quantum system and collapses the wave function? That is, in short, the quantum
13See Goldstein et al. (2010a) for more rigorous definitions.
14Since the wave functions have to be normalized, they form a unit sphere in the subspace. So the
distribution is only on the unit sphereS (H ).
15That is, P(X) = ∫X ∣ψ(x)∣2dx.
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measurement problem.16
Various solutions have been proposed to solve the measurement problem. Bohmian
mechanics (BM) solves it by preserving the Schrödinger dynamics, adding particles
to the ontology, and an additional guidance equation for the particles’ motion.
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theories postulate a spontaneous collapse mecha-
nism, making wave function collapses independent of the observers. Everettian
quantum mechanics (EQM) simply removes the collapse rules from standard quan-
tum mechanics and suggest that there are many (emergent) worlds, corresponding
to the branches of the wave function, which are all real. My aim here is not to
adjudicate among these theories. Suffice it to say that they are all quantum theories
that remove the centrality of observations and observers.
Both BM and GRW use probabilistic postulates to account for the Born rule. BM
postulates the Quantum Equilibrium Distribution, which dictates that the initial
particle configuration is distributed by the Born rule (see Dürr et al. (1992)). GRW
postulates probabilistic modification of the Schrödinger equation by which the cen-
ter of wave function collapses is distributed randomly according to (something close
to) the Born rule. EQM, developed and defended by David Wallace (2012), is the
only one that does not introduce any objective probabilities (but seeks to derive
them from preference axioms). On BM and GRW, SP will postulate a fundamentally
different kind of probabilities from the quantum mechanical probabilities. It would
be desirable if they can be unified. On EQM, the aspiration is to come up with a
theory that explains the probabilistic phenomena in nature, for which the objective
statistical mechanical probabilities of SP will be an obstacle.17
Recent work in the foundations of quantum mechanics suggests that just as we
can add particles in Bohmian mechanics (BM), we can add additional ontologies
to GRW and Everettian theories: GRW with a flashy ontology (GRWf), GRW with
a mass-density ontology (GRWm), and Everettian theory with a mass-density on-
tology (Sm).18 Let us call them quantum theories with additional ontologies. Unlike
Bohmian particles, these additional ontologies are not independent variables from
the wave function.
The above quantum theories—BM, GRW, GRWm, GRWf, EQM, Sm—make plau-
sible the view that I call Wave Function Realism: the universal quantum state is (1)
ontic and (2) completely represented by the universal wave function. This is in
contrast to the epistemic views about the wave function that maintain that the
quantum state, represented by a wave function, corresponds to only our epistemic
uncertainties over the actual state of the world.
In short, the quantum Mentaculus contains the quantum version of the Past
Hypothesis and that of the Statistical Postulate that support the claim that typical
initial microstates will be entropic. Such an understanding can be supplemented
with further interpretations about the meaning of the wave function. But the mar-
16See Bell (1990) and Myrvold (2017) for introductions to the quantum measurement problem.
17There have been some proposals of how to solve these problems, such as Albert (2000), Ch.7 and
Wallace (2011). They rely on two plausible conjectures.
18 Sm was introduced in Allori et al. (2010).
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riage between the Mentaculus and Humeanism is not perfect; as we discuss in §2
and §6, it leads to issues that seem to cry out for a different approach:
• Non-separability and non-narratability problems if we keep the quantum state
in the mosaic;
• Complexity problems if we move the quantum state from the mosaic to the
best system;
• Supervenient-kind and vagueness problems of the Past Hypothesis;
• (Not a problem but worth mentioning: dualism of statistical mechanical prob-
abilities and quantum mechanical probabilities.)
3.2 The Wentaculus
In this section, I construct an alternative framework—the Wentaculus. As we discuss
in §4 and §5, the Wentaculus solves the problems above and provides additional
theoretical virtues. I proceed in two steps: (1) Density Matrix Realism and (2)
the Initial Projection Hypothesis. I will also explain how Humeanism provides
motivations for this new framework.
3.2.1 Density Matrix Realism
In §3.1, we saw that the quantum Mentaculus assigns probabilities over wave func-
tions. Now, there is a well-known method of encoding the probabilities in the
quantum state itself. Instead of saying that the wave function lies inside some sub-
spaceHν and that there is a uniform probability distribution over the wave functions
inHν, quantum theory provides a compact way of putting these two pieces of infor-
mation together into one mathematical gadget—a density matrix. The probability
distribution over wave functions can be represented by a density matrix Wˆν.19
We should not be misled by the language here. Even though we talk about
“constructing a density matrix from a collection of wave functions,” there is a more
intrinsic way of understanding the density matrix that is independent of the wave
functions. A density matrix is a well-defined object in its own right in Hilbert space.
19More precisely, the density matrix is equal to an integral over wave functions inside the unit
sphere of the subspace with respect to the uniform distribution given by the surface area measure:
Wˆν = ∫S (Hν) µ(dψ) ∣ψ⟩ ⟨ψ∣ .Here is a more intuitive way of understanding the construction procedure.
Start from the subspace Hν. It is compatible with many vectors representing different initial wave
functions. Take an arbitrary vector ∣ψ⟩. We can construct a projection operator (projecting to ∣ψ⟩) as∣ψ⟩ ⟨ψ∣. If we apply ∣ψ⟩ ⟨ψ∣ to any other vector ∣φ⟩, it will first take the inner product ⟨ψ∣φ⟩ and output
a scalar c, which measures “how much” of ∣φ⟩ overlaps with ∣ψ⟩. Then it multiplies the scalar to∣ψ⟩, which yields c ∣ψ⟩. Take all the vectors onS (Hν), the unit sphere in the subspace, construct the
corresponding projection operators, and then take the “weighted sum” over the projection operators.
Since there is a continuous infinity of objects to sum over, instead of using an infinite sum, we use
an integral over them with respect to the surface area measure on the unit sphere µ(dψ). This
construction produces a density matrix that represents the probability distribution over the initial
wave function.
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Instead of constructing it from wave functions, we can think of the above-mentioned
density matrix as a simple object defined on subspace Hν. The object contains no
more and no less information than what is contained in the subspace itself. It is
called the normalized projection, whose mathematical representation can be written
as follows:
Wˆν = IνdimHν , (1)
This is the normalized projection onto the subspaceHν. The normalization is achieved
by dividing the subspace identity operator Iν by the dimension of the subspace
dimHν. The identity operator is restricted to the subspace: it does nothing to vectors
contained inside the subspace and projects into the subspace everything that is not
completely contained within.20
Given the intrinsic understanding of density matrices in Hilbert space, is there
a sense we can provide an intrinsic understanding of it on configuration space that
is independent from wave functions and equally objective? The answer is yes. We
call this perspective Density Matrix Realism, in contrast to Wave Function Realism.
Just as we can think of the wave function as a function that assigns values to the
configuration spaceR3N, we can think of the density matrix as a function that assigns
values to the Cartesian product of the configuration space with itself. Moreover, we
can also think of it as a function that assigns values to every ordered pair of points
in configuration space.
Wave Function Realism is motivated by the idea that the wave function is central
to the dynamics and the kinematics of quantum mechanics. In order to motivate
Density Matrix Realism, we need to reformulate quantum mechanics directly in
terms of a fundamental density matrix. Can we do that? The answer is yes.21
First, the density matrix has an evolution equation analogous to that of the wave
function. While the wave function obeys the Schrödinger equation, the density
matrix obeys its generalization to mixed states—the von Neumann equation:
ih̵
dWˆ(t)
dt
= [Hˆ, Wˆ], (2)
where the commutator bracket represents the linear evolution analogous to the
linear evolution described by the Schrödinger equation.
Second, the Born rule distribution can be written in terms of the density matrix:
P(q)dq = W(q, q)dq (3)
Third, we can reformulate BM, GRW, and EQM in terms of the density matrix.22
20Since the diagonal entries of Wˆν add up to 1, it is a density matrix.
21Density Matrix Realism has already been suggested but not necessarily endorsed by some in the
literature. For some recent examples, see Dürr et al. (2005), Maroney (2005), Wallace and Timpson
(2010) and Wallace (2011, 2012). What is new in this paper is the combination of Density Matrix
Realism with the Past Hypothesis in forming the Initial Projection Hypothesis (§2.2.2) and the
argument for the Humean Unification based on that.
22For W-EQM, equation (2) is all there is to govern the fundamental quantum state W.
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We can show that each reformulation of the realist quantum theory in terms of a
universal density matrix W is empirically equivalent to its wave-function counter-
part, if on the latter theories the uncertainty over the universal wave function is
represented by a statistical density matrix W.23 Therefore, these are also empirically
adequate quantum theories without observers. We call these theories W-Bohmian
mechanics, W-GRW theory, and W-Everettian quantum mechanics. Thus, we can think
of W as the central dynamical object in quantum mechanics that produces quan-
For W-EQM with a mass-density ontology, we can define the mass density function in terms of the
density matrix:
m(x, t) = tr(M(x)W(t)), (4)
where M(x) = ∑i miδ(Qi − x) is the mass-density operator, which is defined via the position operator
Qiψ(q1, q2, ...qn) = qiψ(q1, q2, ...qn). This allows us to determine the mass-density ontology at time t
via W(t).
For W-BM, we can postulate the guidance equation as follows:
dQi
dt
= h̵
mi
Im
∇qi W(q, q′, t)
W(q, q′, t) (q = q′ = Q), (5)
Finally, we can impose a boundary condition similar to that of the Quantum Equilibrium Hypothesis:
P(Q(t0) ∈ dq) = W(q, q, t0)dq. (6)
Since the system is also equivariant, if the probability distribution holds at t0, it holds at all times.
Equivariance holds because of the following continuity equation:
∂W(q, q, t)
∂t
= −div(W(q, q, t)v),
where v denotes the velocity field generated via (5.) This theory is first described in Dürr et al. (2005)
and Maroney (2005). Dürr et al. (2005) call this theory W-Bohmian mechanics.
For W-GRW (first suggested in Allori et al. (2013)), between collapses, the density matrix will
evolve unitarily according to the von Neumann equation. It collapses randomly, where the random
time for an N-particle system is distributed with rate Nλ, where λ is of order 10−15 s−1. At a random
time when a collapse occur at “particle” k at time T−, the post-collapse density matrix at time T+ is
the following:
WT+ = Λk(X)1/2WT−Λk(X)1/2tr(WT−Λk(X)) , (7)
with X distributed by the following probability density:
ρ(x) = tr(WT−Λk(x)), (8)
where WT+ is the post-collapse density matrix, WT− is the pre-collapse density matrix, X is the center
of the actual collapse, and Λk(x) is the collapse rate operator defined as follows:
Λk(x) = 1(2piσ2)3/2 e− (Qk−x)22σ2 ,
where Qk is the position operator of “particle” k, and σ is a new constant of nature of order 10−7 m
postulated in current GRW theories.
For W-GRWm, we can let the density matrix determine the mass density function on space-time
by (4). For W-GRWf, we postulate flashes that are the space-time events at the centers (X) of the
W-GRW collapses.
23This is because the predictions of quantum theory are probabilistic; it does not matter whether
the density matrix we use to extract predictions is statistical or fundamental. See Dürr et al. (2005),
Wallace (2016), and Chen (2019a) for more detailed arguments.
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tum mechanical phenomena and determine the behaviors of “local beables.” This
makes possible an “ontic” interpretation of the density matrix: it is the complete
description of the quantum state of the world; there is no more fundamental fact
about which wave function is the actual one. Thus, the framework of Density Matrix
Realism is a viable alternative to Wave Function Realism.
3.2.2 The Initial Projection Hypothesis
The quantum Mentaculus is most plausible in the framework of Wave Function
Realism. On that view, the wave function represents the quantum state of the world,
the Past Hypothesis is a constraint on the initial wave function, and the Statistical
Postulate is a uniform probability distribution over possible wave functions.
In the framework of Density Matrix Realism, the wave function no longer repre-
sents the quantum state. Instead, a density matrix completely represents the initial
state. Hence, we can consider reformulating the low-entropy boundary condition
as the constraint on the density matrix. However, just as there are many wave
functions compatible with HPH, there are many density matrices compatible with
HPH, the Past Hypothesis subspace in the total Hilbert space. One could perhaps
construct a probability distribution over the possible initial density matrices.
Interestingly, Density Matrix Realism provides a much simpler constraint that
combines the Past Hypothesis and the Statistical Postulate that is unavailable in the
wave function framework. We postulate that the initial density matrix is the simplest
and most natural density matrix associated withHPH: its normalized projection. It
can be expressed as follows:
WˆIPH(t0) = IPHdimHPH , (9)
It is the identity operator onHPH divided by the dimension ofHPH. I label its Hilbert
space representation as WˆIPH(t0). In the position representation, it is WIPH(q, q′, t0).
This constraint is motivated by Humeanism. The goal of a Humean theorist is
to come up with the simplest and most informative summary of the history of the
world. If we can avoid the postulation of a probability distribution by making the
initial state unique, then the Humean theorist would be motivated to do so. As we
shall see in the next section, the postulate leads to further benefits to Humeanism.
In contrast, there is no obvious candidate for the simplest or most natural wave
function compatible with the Past Hypothesis.
Therefore, I propose that we add the following postulate to any quantum theory
in the framework of Density Matrix Realism:
Initial Projection Hypothesis: The initial quantum state of the universe is WˆIPH(t0).
The Initial Projection Hypothesis (IPH) plays a similar role as that of the Past Hy-
pothesis (PH). They both rule out many available initial states on the state space to
explain the time asymmetry in our universe. They carry the same information about
initial entropy. PH selects the initial wave function to be one of the wave functions
17
Figure 1: The expected growth of entropy under the Initial Projection Hypothesis
(IPH) and the density-matrix dynamics.
inside HPH, and IPH selects the initial density matrix to be the (unique) normal-
ized projection on HPH. Both have exactly the same amount of entropy—that of
HPH.24 However, there are some important differences between IPH and PH. First,
IPH picks out a unique initial quantum state of the universe while PH does not.
In so far as the Past Hypothesis subspace can be unambiguously specified given
some coarse-graining variables, the normalized projection can be unambiguously
specified, and IPH also unambiguously specifies the initial state as WˆIPH(t0).25 In
contrast, PH narrows down the initial wave function to be inside the subspaceHPH,
which is still compatible with an infinite number of different wave functions.
Second, IPH requires no further statistical mechanical probability distribution
while PH needs to be supplemented with SP. Since IPH chooses a unique initial
state, there is no need to add a probability weighting on the initial states compatible
with IPH. However, PH is compatible with many wave functions, some of which
will evolve to lower-entropy states. Hence, PH needs to be supplemented with a
statistical mechanical probability distribution (SP) that assigns high weight to the
“good” wave functions and low weight to the “bad” ones.
When we add IPH to Density Matrix Realism, we arrive at an alternative account
of time’s arrow in a quantum universe:
24SB(ΨPH(t0)) = SB(WIPH(t0)) = kBlog(dimHPH), where SB is the Boltzmann entropy function, kB
is the Boltzmann constant, and “dim” counts the dimensionality of the subspace.
25There are additional subtleties about vagueness, which we explore in §5.2.
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The Wentaculus
1. Fundamental Dynamical Laws (FDL): the quantum state of the universe
is represented by a density matrix Wˆ(t) that obeys the von Neumann
equation (2).a
2. The Initial Projection Hypothesis (IPH): at a temporal boundary of the
universe, the density matrix is the normalized projection onto HPH, a
low-dimensional subspace of the total Hilbert space. (That is, the initial
quantum state of the universe is WˆIPH(t0) as described in (9).)
aFor GRW-type theories, the density matrix obeys the stochastic modification of the von
Neumann equation described in footnote #22).
This is the W-version of the Mentaculus. Let us call it the Wentaculus. To solve the
quantum measurement problem, we can construct Bohmian, Everettian, and GRW
versions of the Wentaculus.26 Let us call these theories WIPH-quantum theories. In
§4, we show that the Wentaculus naturally leads to a Humean unification of the
origins of quantum entanglement and time asymmetry. Such a unification will bear
many fruits (§5).
4 The Humean Unification
We have seen that the density matrix formalism opens up a new possibility for a time-
asymmetric quantum-mechanical world: it can be described by the WIPH-quantum
theories of the Wentaculus. In this section, I show that Humeanism allows us to
further simplify the theoretical structure, by unifying the sources of time asymmetry
and quantum entanglement and removing the quantum state from the mosaic. First,
I argue for the Nomological Thesis. Second, I show that Humeanism allows us to
obtain a unified explanation of time asymmetry and quantum entanglement. Third,
I discuss two new wrinkles brought up by the Humean unification.
4.1 The Nomological Thesis
As we discussed in §2, the classical Mentaculus consist in three postulates—the fun-
damental dynamical equations, the Past Hypothesis, and the Statistical Postulate—
all of which can be admitted, by the best-system account, as Humean laws. The Past
Hypothesis and the Statistical Postulate are not the usual dynamical laws. In partic-
ular, the Past Hypothesis is regarded as a Humean law even though it may look like
just another contingent initial condition. Even before we get into Humeanism, there
are pre-theoretical reasons (reasons that are conceptually prior to a systematic view
about laws) that support its nomological status. For example, plausibly it plays
a starring role in deriving the Second Law of Thermodynamics; and perhaps also
in deriving the counterfactual asymmetries, the records asymmetry, the epistemic
26The Wentaculus as it is will be sufficient for WIPH-EQM. See §4.2 for the the Bohmian version.
19
asymmetry, and influence asymmetry in time. They support the idea that the Past
Hypothesis is nomologically necessary and not merely contingent. Absent any fur-
ther nomological explanation of the Past Hypothesis,27 plausibly it is a law of nature
and not a contingent initial condition.
The Humean best-system account provides another argument for the nomologi-
cal status of the Past Hypothesis. Take for example the quantum Mentaculus. If we
subtract the Past Hypothesis and the Statistical Postulate from the Mentaculus, the
theory is much weaker. Let us call it the quantum Mentaculus−:
The Quantum Mentaculus−
Fundamental Dynamical Laws (FDL): the quantum microstate of the uni-
verse is represented by a wave function Ψ that obeys the Schrödinger
equation.
This is the Mentaculus without PH and SP. Since it is time symmetric, it does
not ground lawful generalizations such as the Second Law of Thermodynamics and
many other temporal asymmetries. As it is, it is much less informative than the
Mentaculus. The Mentaculus− would be much more informative if we add to it PH
and SP.
Moreover, PH and SP are not very complex. The uniform surface area measure,
specified by SP, is a simple probability measure on the subspace. PH is simple in the
macro-language specified in terms of the macro-variables such as temperature, vol-
ume, densities, and entropy. In fact, PH could also be simple in the micro-language.
A version of PH in the general relativistic cosmological context is the Weyl Curva-
ture Hypothesis (WCH), which is a simple postulate about the initial geometry.28
To have a complete quantum generalization of WCH would require a theory of
quantum gravity, which is still work in progress. However, there are reasons to be
hopeful. For example, the generalization of WCH in the Loop Quantum Cosmology
program has yielded the Quantum Homogeneity and Isotropy Hypothesis (QHIH)
27That is, we set aside in this paper the possibility explored by Carroll and Chen (2004).
28 In the context of thinking about the origin of the Second Law of Thermodynamics in the early
universe with high homogeneity and isotropy, and the relationship between space-time geometry
and entropy, Penrose proposes a hypothesis:
I propose, then, that there should be complete lack of chaos in the initial geometry.
We need, in any case, some kind of low-entropy constraint on the initial state. But
thermal equilibrium apparently held (at least very closely so) for the matter (including
radiation) in the early stages. So the ‘lowness’ of the initial entropy was not a result
of some special matter distribution, but, instead, of some very special initial spacetime
geometry. The indications of [previous sections], in particular, are that this restriction
on the early geometry should be something like: the Weyl curvature Cabcd vanishes at any
initial singularity. (Penrose (1979), p.630, emphasis original)
The Weyl curvature tensor Cabcd is the traceless part of the Riemann curvature tensor Rabcd. It is
not fixed completely by the stress-energy tensor and thus has independent degrees of freedom in
Einstein’s general theory of relativity. Since the entropy of matter distribution is quite high, the origin
of thermodynamic asymmetry should be due to the low entropy in geometry, which corresponds
very roughly to the vanishing of the Weyl curvature tensor. The Weyl Curvature Hypothesis is
simple to state in the language of general relativity.
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according to which the initial quantum state has to come from a small subset of
possible states with low entropy. It retains the general features of WCH but also
introduces some vagueness (about the proper duration of the Planck regime), which
is to be expected for any hypothesis that relies on some kind of coarse-graining.29
We have good reasons to think that the quantum Mentaculus could be the best
system. Thus, we have good reasons to think that PH and SP are parts of the best
system. On the modified Humean theory of laws and objective probabilities, it
follows that PH is a Humean law of nature and SP specifies objective probabilities
in the world.
Similarly, the best system from the point of view of Density Matrix Realism is the
Wentaculus. Given the crucial role IPH plays in the Wentaculus, it is plausible that
IPH should be regarded as a Humean law if the Wentaculus is the best system. After
all, IPH has the same informational content as PH. They both specify a low-entropy
initial condition. Moreover, IPH is as simple as PH+SP. They pick out the same
density matrix in the low-entropy subspace.
Hence, in so far as we have good reasons to take PH to be a Humean law if
the quantum Mentaculus is true, we have equally good reasons to take IPH to be a
Humean law if the Wentaculus is true. That is, if Wentaculus is the right theory of the
actual world, then we have good reasons to confer (Humean) nomological status to
IPH that are on a par with our reasons for conferring (Humean) nomological status
to PH. But how do we know which is true: the Mentaculus or the Wentaculus?
Here we encounter a case of underdetermination by evidence. The two theories
are empirically equivalent: no amount of empirical evidence can settle the question
which one is correct. However, we can use super-empirical virtues, some of which
will be discussed in §5.
Both PH and IPH are Humean laws that are about the initial quantum state. As
discussed before, it is controversial what the quantum states represent. But what is
the nature of the initial quantum state? One promising answer suggests that it is
nomological.
The Nomological Thesis: The initial quantum state of the world is nomological,
i.e. it is on a par with laws of nature.
The Nomological Thesis, on the one hand, is in tension with the complexity issue in
the quantum Mentaculus. Even though PH is simple, the wave function compatible
with PH is unlikely to be simple enough to be nomological. The Humeans could
follow Dürr et al. (1996) and claim that the Wheeler-DeWitt equation in quantum
gravity would produce a time-independent wave function that may also be simple
enough. Even though the Wheeler-DeWitt equation leads to fascinating scientific
and interpretational questions, the Humeans who endorse this strategy faces several
challenges. First, a technical challenge: given the time-independence of the wave
function, the time asymmetry cannot be described in terms of the entropy of the
universal wave function, and that would require significant changes to the Mentac-
ulus program. Moreover, it does not follow that a time-independent wave function
29For more details, see Ashtekar and Gupt (2016a) and Ashtekar and Gupt (2016b).
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will definitely be simple. We need additional reasons to support that conjecture.
Second, a strategy question: do Humeans want to tie the survival and success of
Humeanism to a particular equation in quantum gravity, which has yet to play a
central role in research programs such as string theory? It seems reasonable to seek
alternative ways to defend the Nomological Thesis. If for nothing else, it would be
a safer strategy to find multiple ways to reconcile Humeanism with fundamental
physics.
On the other hand, the Wentaculus transforms the situation. Since IPH is a
law, and since IPH completely specifies the initial quantum state, WIPH(t0) is no
more complex than IPH itself. So if IPH is simple enough to be nomological, then
WIPH(t0) is simple enough to be nomological. (In contrast, even though PH is simple
enough, the initial wave function in the Mentaculus may not be simple.) Hence, in
the Wentaculus (but not in the Mentaculus), we can easily remove the complexity
obstacle by regarding the initial quantum state to be on a par with laws of nature.
We propose that the Humeans remove the initial quantum state from the mosaic
and move it to the best system. Its values can be completely and in a simple way
specified by the best system. Hence, moving WIPH(t0) to the best system is not going
to overburden the best system or make it more complex, since IPH already contains
that information. This is to be contrasted with the situation in the Mentaculus: the
PH does not contain all the information to pin down the initial microstate (wave
function) while the IPH in the Wentaculus does contain all the information to pin
down the initial microstate (density matrix). However, after we remove the quantum
states from the mosaic, we need something to be still present in the mosaic. We can
use the additional ontologies in quantum theories such as BM, Sm, GRWm, and
GRWf. The fundamental ontology, in each of these theories, will be the particles,
matter densities, or flashes, which are separable.
What about later quantum states WIPH(t1), WIPH(t2),..., and so on? Do we need
to postulate them in the mosaic? That is not necessary. For unitary quantum
theories such as BM and Sm, their information can be directly derived from the
von Neumann equation, which is also in the best system. For stochastic theories,
the initial quantum state (in the best system) can specify a complete probability
distribution and conditional probabilities over possible mosaic histories.30
4.2 A Unified Explanation
If the initial quantum state is nomological, then the Humean best system contains
all of its information: without adding any contingent fact from the mosaic, we can
30 The GRW route is different from the way we think about making predictions on GRW theories.
That might mean that the GRW route of Humean unification is less natural than the route on unitary
theories. Hence, Humean unification may be sensitive to empirical questions about whether GRW
is correct, and whether quantum theory is exact. Even if one is bothered by this sensitivity, one need
not give it too much weight all things considered. So far, all experimental tests to find violations of
unitary dynamics and the deviations from exact Born rule have only but confirmed exact quantum
theories such as BM and EQM; we have not found any confirmation of GRW over its rivals. For a
review, see Feldmann and Tumulka (2012).
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deduce its state at any time with just the best system alone. We do not need to,
as we standardly do, independently specify the initial condition of the quantum
state as a contingent fact in the mosaic. This opens up a new possibility for WIPH-
quantum theories with additional ontologies. For these theories, we can remove the
quantum state from the mosaic without losing any information about entanglement
and correlations, for such information is already contained in the best system. And
the mosaic will not be empty—it will still contain the local beables such as particles,
matter densities, and flashes, which make up pointers, tables, and chairs. From a
Humean point of view, the best system (now the Wentaculus plus the values of the
initial quantum state) supervenes on the mosaic.
Take WIPH-BM for example. Let us write down the mosaic + best system package
without the Humean unification:
The WIPH-BM mosaic: particle trajectories Q(t) on physical space-time and
the quantum state WIPH(t).
The WIPH-BM best system: four equations—the simplest and strongest ax-
ioms summarizing the mosaic:
(A) The von Neumann equation: ih̵∂Wˆ∂t = [Hˆ, Wˆ],
(B) The Initial Projection Hypothesis: WˆIPH(t0) = IPHdimHPH
(C) The W-Quantum Equilibrium Hypothesis: P(Q(t0) ∈ dq) =
WIPH(q, q, t0)dq,
(D) The W-guidance equation: dQidt = h̵mi Im∇qi WIPH(q,q′,t)WIPH(q,q′,t) (q = q′ = Q).
What would it look like after Humean unification? It will have fewer things in
the mosaic and fewer equations in the best system.
The WIPH-BM mosaic: particle trajectories Q(t) on physical space-time.
The WIPH-BM best system: three equations—the simplest and strongest ax-
ioms summarizing the mosaic:
(A) The Initial Projection Hypothesis: WˆIPH(t0) = IPHdimHPH
(B) The W-Quantum Equilibrium Hypothesis: P(Q(t0) ∈ dq) =
WIPH(q, q, t0)dq,
(C) The combined equation: dQidt = h̵mi Im∇qi ⟨q∣e−iHˆt/h̵WˆIPH(t0)eiHˆt/h̵∣q′⟩⟨q∣e−iHˆt/h̵WˆIPH(t0)eiHˆt/h̵∣q′⟩ (q = q′ = Q)
In this theory, the mosaic no longer contains the quantum state. IPH still pos-
tulates the values of the initial quantum state WˆIPH(t0). But it is dispensable. The
role it plays in the best system above is to specify the values of the initial probability
distribution and the velocity field for particles. We can rewrite any occurrence of
WˆIPH(t0) in terms of its explicit functional form. We can construct similar Humean
interpretations of WIPH-GRWm, WIPH-GRWf, and WIPH-Sm.
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The nomological role of the quantum state here is similar to that of the Hamil-
tonian in classical mechanics. The Hamiltonian specifies the interactions or the
“forces” among the component systems. The Hamiltonian is on par with the clas-
sical laws of motion as it is a simple part of the Hamiltonian equations. That is, if
we expand the Hamiltonian function as a function of the variables for things in the
mosaic (positions and velocities of particles), the equation is still simple.31 Similarly,
the quantum state is a simple part of the von Neumann equation. However, an
important difference is that equation (C) is time-dependent, while the Hamiltonian
equations of motion are time-independent.
I call such an interpretive strategy the Humean Unification. Humean Unifica-
tion recommends that we remove the quantum state from the mosaic. How, then,
does one explain the phenomena of quantum entanglement? How can systems
at space-like separation be perfectly correlated, if there is no fact about quantum
entanglement in the mosaic? The Humean Unification provides purely nomic expla-
nations. There is a law that specifies the quantum entanglement of all the systems
at t0, from which we can use the von Neumann equation to derive quantum entan-
glement at a later time t. The equation for local beables (such as (4) and (5)) will
then determine the behavior of objects in space-time: e.g. if Alice were to observe
“Spin Up” then Bob would observe “Spin Down.” (Both the observers and the ob-
served systems will be made out of the local beables and not of the quantum state.)
Moreover, the law that specifies the quantum initial condition—IPH—is the same
law that specifies the low-entropy initial condition. Hence, IPH is the origin of both
quantum entanglement and time asymmetry.
The Humean unification provides a unified view on the sources of quantum
entanglement and time asymmetry. In the Mentaculus, they have distinct sources—
one macroscopic Past Hypothesis and one microscopic wave function. But in the
Wentaculus, it is one and the same density matrix.
The time-dependence of the equation of motion (such as the combined equation
(C)) in the unified best system further suggests that there is intertwining between
the two. In the Mentaculus picture, the theory as a whole is not time-translation-
invariant, because the Past Hypothesis applies only at a particular time. However,
we can still understand the sense in which the Mentaculus picture is still time-
translation-invariant: we can separate the dynamics from the initial condition, even
when both are Humean laws; the dynamics is invariant even when the lawful initial
condition is not. But in the Wentaculus picture, after Humean unification, there
31The Hamiltonian equations are:
∂qi
∂t
= ∂H
∂pi
,
∂pi
∂t
= −∂H
∂qi
. (10)
The Hamiltonian function is specified as follows:
H(q,p) = N∑
i=1
p2i
2mi
+ ∑∑
1≤k<l≤N Vk,l(∣qk − ql∣), (11)
where Vk,l is a simple formula for the pair-wise interactions.
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is no such clean separation. The two, as it were, are genuinely unified into one
thing, so there is no sense in which the theory is fundamentally invariant under
time translation.
The violation of time-translation invariance should be viewed not as a bug but
as a feature of Humean unification. After all, is it reasonable to insist on saving
the symmetry at the cost of everything else? Of course not. Does this particular
violation make the theory less simple? No; in fact the theory becomes simpler
because of it. Can we still make sense of the appearance of this symmetry? Yes.
At the emergent level of effective dynamics and subsystem dynamics, we can still
make sense of a time-translation-invariant non-fundamental dynamics. For many
subsystems, they will have (non-fundamental) subsystem density matrices that still
obey time-translation-invariant (effective) laws.32
4.3 New Wrinkles
The Humean unification is based on a new theoretical possibility opened up by
the conjunction of Density Matrix Realism and the Initial Projection Hypothesis.
However, it also leads to some new wrinkles that should be addressed. We focus
on two here: the complexity worry and the classical maneuver.
(1) The complexity worry. The Initial Projection Hypothesis selects a density
matrix that is mathematically equivalent to a “disjunction” of wave functions with a
uniform measure over them. If any wave function in the disjunct is overly complex,
shouldn’t the whole disjunction, and therefore the initial density matrix, be overly
complex? How is that compatible with the earlier claim that the Initial Projection
Hypothesis as well as the initial density matrix are simple enough to be nomological?
The intuition behind this worry is that the disjunction inherits whatever complexity
that is in the disjuncts, and the initial density matrix WˆIPH(t0) will be highly complex,
and perhaps even more so than typical wave functions. So our criticism about the
standard wave function nomological view comes back to haunt us.
That is not quite right. We offer a counterexample to the intuition and a positive
argument for the simplicity of the initial density matrix. Let us consider classical
mechanics governed by F = ma. We can think of the content of F = ma as given
by the disjunction of all the solutions to that equation, namely the disjunction of
all complete trajectories of any number of point particles that classical mechanics
allows. Most of those trajectories will be highly complex. However, F = ma is a
simple law, even though it is informationally equivalent to the complete disjunction
of its possible solutions. Positive argument: there are ways of understanding the
density matrix that is independent of the collection of wave functions; the quantum
state space (Hilbert space) permits a straightforward, intrinsic, and geometrical
understanding of the initial density matrix selected by IPH. In fact, it is (modulo the
normalization constant) equivalent to the subspace itself. While an individual vector
32 Even if one is worried about the loss of (fundamental) time-translation invariance, the theoretical
cost should be viewed in the context of and in balance with the numerous theoretical benefits that
we discuss in §5.
25
in the subspace (the wave function) may require many coordinate numbers to pick
out, the subspace requires much less information to specify. The availability of the
intrinsic understanding of the fundamental density matrix WˆIPH(t0) also responds
to the supervenient-kind problem raised in §2.
(2) The classical maneuver. One might worry that the same “trick” can be played
in the classical context, which somehow makes the Humean unification look too
easy and perhaps trivial. On first glance, the suggested maneuver is to take the
“probability distribution” (ρ) as “ontic.” The same thing can presumably be taken
in the classical context, where the probability distribution on phase space can be
given a similar ontic interpretation, thus avoiding the problems in the classical
domain as well. If that is possible, moreover, it seems to show that either we have
proven too much, or that it does not depend on the details of quantum theory.
However, that is a mistake. First, it is much less natural to give an ontic in-
terpretation of the probability distribution in classical statistical mechanics. If we
use the same idea in the classical domain, we will likely get a many-worlds version
of classical mechanics or lose determinism. The classical probability distribution
ρ plays no dynamical role (unlike the density matrix in the W-quantum theories).
Moreover, since ρ follows the Hamiltonian dynamics, it will in general be supported
on many macroscopically distinct regions on phase space. If we reify ρ as ontic and
do not modify the dynamics, then we arrive at a many-worlds theory. If we modify
the dynamics to introduce objective “collapses” of ρ into one of the “branches,” it
will look much more artificial and complex than the original Hamiltonian theory. In
contrast, on each of the three interpretations of QM, the artificial effects do not arise
on the Wentaculus. The Bohmian version remains deterministic (and single-world),
the GRW version remains stochastic (and single-world), and the Everettian / many-
worlds version is still deterministic. On the other hand, even if a classical extension
of our maneuver is possible, it is unclear how it makes the quantum case trivial,
since presumably both require different choices of the ontology and the dynamics.
5 Fruits of Humean Unification
The Humean Unification has consequences for both the Humean mosaic and the
best system. In this section, we list some fruits of this project.
5.1 The Mosaic: Simpler, Separable, and Narratable
Under Humean Unification, the Humean mosaic becomes simpler, separable, and
narratable. In standard quantum theories, it is plausible that the quantum state
represents something in the mosaic. This leads to a non-separable entity or relation
that violates one of the tenets of Humean supervenience: that the mosaic must be
separable. The Humean Unification lifts the quantum state from the mosaic into the
best system (without adding too much complexity to the best system). It simplifies
the mosaic by removing the quantum state ontology and postulating local matters
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in spacetime—particles, matter density, or flashes. The separability of the mosaic is
now restored.
This result provides a response to Teller (1986)’s and Maudlin (2007)’s influential
argument that Humean supervenience is incompatible with quantum mechanics. It
does so without incurring new costs (see contrast with rival proposals in §6) and
with many new benefits (as we see in this section).
An under-appreciated consequence of this result is that it also helps with Al-
bert (2015)’s recent argument that quantum entanglement is incompatible with full
Lorentz invariance.33 This is best seen in WIPH-Sm, which aspires to be a fully
Lorentz-invariant theory. Albert (2015) shows that the conjunction of Lorentz in-
variance and entanglement is inconsistent with narratability, the idea that the full
history of the world can be narrated in a single temporal sequence, and other ways
of narrating it will be its geometrical transformations. To describe a narratable
mosaic temporally, it suffices to list facts along one foliation (with the rest being ge-
ometrical transformations); to describe a non-narratable mosaic such as the one that
contains entanglement relations, we need to list facts along every foliation, which
is infinitely more complex. Thus, one can understand narratability as something
akin to descriptive parsimony, which is a desirable but defeasible virtue to be bal-
anced with other considerations. (After all, one can consistently insist on specifying
states only directly on the mosaic and not through any temporal sequences picked
out along some foliation.) In so far as one finds narratability a plausible principle,
there is tension between Lorentz invariance and quantum entanglement (which is a
purely kinematic notion).
However, Albert’s argument presupposes that the entanglement relations are
in the mosaic. However, if we remove the quantum state from the mosaic, the
trouble-maker is gone, and the mosaic can be both Lorentz invariant and narratable.
This avoids the narratability failure mentioned earlier. (A similar result holds for
WIPH-GRWm and WIPH-GRWf.) By allowing the mosaic to be fully narratable and
allowing the laws to be fully Lorentz invariant, Humean unification could lead to
further simplification of the mosaic and the best system. By removing the conflict
between Lorentz invariance and narratability, the Humean Unification removes
some tension between quantum mechanics and special relativity.34
In summary, the Humean unification strategy simplifies the mosaic by removing
the quantum entanglement relations, leaving with a fundamental ontology that is
separable and narratable that has a better chance of reconciling quantum theory
with fully Lorentz invariance (for those theories that have such aspirations). The
quantum entanglement relations and the quantum state would be absorbed into the
best system, which then supervenes on the new mosaic.
33I am indebted to discussions with Sheldon Goldstein and Ezra Rubenstein on this point.
34To be sure, there is still the issue of quantum non-locality.
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5.2 The Best System: Simpler, Less Vague, and More Unified
The Humean unification leads to some important modifications of the Humean best
system, making it simpler, less vague, and more unified. By lifting the quantum
state from the mosaic to the best system, prima facie we increase the complexity of
the best system by exactly the amount of complexity of the quantum state. If the
quantum state is highly complex, then the resultant best system will be complex
as well. Even if the mosaic becomes simpler and separable, the costs may still be
too high for the Humeans. (That may be the case for some of our rivals. See §6.)
However, given the analysis in §4 about the simplicity of the Past Hypothesis and
the Initial Projection Hypothesis, the initial quantum state is simple enough to be
nomological. Making WˆIPH(t0) on a par with Humean laws does not overburden
the best system. In fact, since the Wentaculus best system already contains IPH,
and IPH completely specifies the values of WˆIPH(t0), there is no added complexity
when we lift WˆIPH(t0) to the best system. That is a significant advantage over other
versions of quantum Humeanism where the focus is on the quantum wave function
that is likely much more complex than the initial density matrix.
The Humean unification simplifies the best system in another way: it elimi-
nates fundamental statistical mechanical probabilities in the best system. In the
quantum Mentaculus, there are two kinds of probabilities: the quantum probabil-
ities prescribed by the Born rule (or the quantum equilibrium distribution in BM,
the collapse probabilities in GRW, and the non-physical decision-theoretic or de se
probabilities in EQM) and the statistical mechanical probabilities prescribed by the
Statistical Postulate (SP). It would be desirable to unify the two sources of probabili-
ties in the theory.Albert (2000)§7 attempts to do it in the GRW framework, relying on
a plausible conjecture about Gaussian width during GRW collapses. Wallace (2011)
proposes we replace the SP by something like a simplicity constraint, relying on a
conjecture about simplicity and reversibility. On Humean unification, however, we
have a completely general way of getting rid of SP. By choosing a unique and natural
initial density matrix, we no longer have an infinity of possible initial microstates.
There is just one state to choose from and we no longer need any probability distri-
bution over possible initial microstates. The Humean unification provides a simple
and general way to avoid the dualism of probabilities. This is achieved by making
SP simply unnecessary.35
In contrast to the quantum Mentaculus (and the classical Mentaculus), Humean
unification contains less vagueness. The Past Hypothesis and the Statistical Pos-
tulate are exact only when we choose some arbitrary coarse-graining variables in
nature. On the Mentaculus, which exact set of microstates counts as the low-entropy
subspace, after a certain level of precision, will be entirely arbitrary. There is noth-
ing in nature that pins it down. Beyond a level of precision, the exact boundary
of the subspace makes no difference to how things are behaving in physical space
and what their probabilities are. The same is true for the Statistical Postulate: the
35For WIPH-Everettian theories, since the Born rule is not supposed to be fundamental, the elim-
ination of SP means that there are no objective probabilities in the world. The actual world is
nomologically necessary. Hence, every physical fact would follow from the law statements.
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support of the probability distribution becomes exact only after we impose some
arbitrary choices, and the exact values do not matter after a certain level of precision.
So it is best to think of PH and SP as vague postulates and vague Humean laws
in the best system of the Mentaculus.36 The situation is different under the Wen-
taculus picture. The exact values of the initial density matrix makes a difference to
the world just as importantly as constants of nature—different values will typically
lead to different microscopic behaviors and probabilities. The exact values of the
initial quantum state is by no means arbitrary—WˆIPH(t0) plays a central role in the
fundamental micro-dynamics; it makes a difference to the exact Bohmian velocity
field, GRW collapse probabilities, and configuration of matter densities, etc. That is
why we can eliminate the vagueness of IPH without objectionable arbitrariness.
Another advantage of Humean unification is that it leads to more unity in the
best system. First, it provides mathematical unity between quantum mechanics
and quantum statistical mechanics. Quantum statistical mechanics makes extensive
use of density matrices. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, has often been
formulated in terms of wave functions. From the perspective of Humean unification,
density matrix is the central object in both theories. A wave function only arises
in special circumstances when the density matrix is pure. Second, there is an
increase in the dynamical unity in some theories. In BM with spin, there does
not exist a conditional wave function since the particles have only positions but
no spin degrees of freedom. Hence, in general, for the subsystems in a W-BM
universe, there is only a conditional density matrix instead of a conditional wave
function. As a result, the guidance equation for many subsystems (that are suitably
isolated from the environment) will be the W-guidance equation (5) that refers to
a conditional density matrix even in standard BM, while the guidance equation
for the whole universe will be the usual guidance equation that refers to a wave
function.37 Therefore, the dynamics for the universe will be importantly different
from the dynamics for the subsystems for standard BM. In contrast, in WIPH-BM,
the guidance equation for the whole universe and that for the subsystems (that are
suitably isolated from the environment) will be the same—(5). Whether dynamical
unity holds for WIPH-GRWm and WIPH-Sm will require a further analysis of the
subsystem dynamics in those theories. But in any case, those theories also witness
an increase in kinematic unity: both the universe and typical subsystems will be in
mixed states described by density matrices. This is in contrast to the Mentaculus
picture, where most subsystems are in mixed states (due to entanglement) while the
universe is in a pure state.
36I discuss the notion of “nomic vagueness” in more details in Chen (2020).
37See Dürr et al. (2005) for more details. The standard guidance equation in BM under a universal
wave function is:
dQi
dt
= h̵
mi
Im
ψ∗∇iψ
ψ∗ψ (12)
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6 Comparisons
In this section, we discuss two other versions of quantum Humeanism that are
motivated by the problem of quantum entanglement but not the problem of time
asymmetry. We compare and contrast them with the Humean unification we intro-
duced in this paper.
6.1 Wave Function Humeanism in a High-Dimensional Space
One of the earliest proposals of reconciling Humeanism with quantum entanglement
is that of Loewer (1996). Loewer argues that if we adopt David Albert’s high-
dimensional space fundamentalism, the idea that the fundamental space of the
world is the “configuration space,” then the quantum state (represented by a wave
function) is entirely separable in that fundamental space. We can reify that as the
Humean mosaic. Entanglement and non-locality are merely manifestations of our
perception in the low-dimensional space, which is not fundamental.
The move from a low-dimensional space to a high-dimensional space is a rad-
ical move. It is revisionary from the Humean perspective. On Lewis’s original
formulation, the Humean mosaic are facts about the physical space-time (or some
low-dimensional manifold). But it is also revisionary from the ordinary scien-
tific perspective. There are important reasons to take something like the physi-
cal space-time to be fundamental, as it underlies many important symmetries in
physics, including Lorentz invariance. They will be difficult to recover from the
high-dimensional point of view.38 In contrast, the Humean Unification does not
require such radical revisions and even offers additional theoretical benefits.
6.2 Wave Function Humeanism in a Low-Dimensional Space
The second class of proposals of reconciling Humeanism with quantum entangle-
ment is inspired by Hall (2015), and discussed in Miller (2013), Esfeld (2014), Bhogal
and Perry (2015), Callender (2015), Esfeld and Deckert (2017). On this proposal, the
quantum state of the universe represented by a wave function is part of the Humean
best system. There are three ways to interpret this proposal.
First interpretation: the wave function itself represents a simple and informative
Humean law of nature (like the classical Hamiltonian). Miller and Callender are
close to endorse this view. However, it requires that the universal wave function to
be extremely simple, or at least simpler than the complete facts about local beables
through all time. Otherwise the system containing the wave function would not
win the competition for being the best system. It faces the prima facie problem that
the universal wave function may not be simple enough to be nomological.
38See Allori (2013) for related reasons. Chen (2017) argues that the low-dimensional view provides
better explanation of the Symmetrization Postulate than the high-dimensional view does. Emery
(2017) provides reasons to think that other things being equal we should prefer the more common-
sense view of physical reality.
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Second interpretation: the wave function supervenes on the mosaic and partici-
pates in the dynamical laws of nature. On this view, the Humean laws refer to the
wave function, but the wave function itself is not “nomological” in the usual sense.
Instead, the wave function is another state of the world—albeit a non-fundamental
one. As such, both the wave function and the dynamical laws supervene on the
mosaic. This interpretation seems close to the views developed by Bhogal and Perry.
The natural question arises again: does the wave function have to be relatively sim-
ple? They seem to think so and suggests that the universal wave function (together
with the dynamical laws) will be simpler than the mosaic itself. Notwithstanding
their careful analysis, we are not convinced: even when the wave function helps
systematize the mosaic (as their examples suggest), it is no trivial task to establish
the simplicity of the universal wave function (relative to the mosaic). If, on the other
hand, we need to relax our criterion of simplicity, we may ask whether it is worth
the benefits. Perhaps there is a system that contains the simplest wave function over
all rivals; still in that case the wave function could be, given the standard scientific
criterion of simplicity, too complex to be on par with laws. That would count as a
(defeasible) consideration against the interpretation. The worry is dissolved if none
of the alternatives is better. However, as we argued in §4 and §5, there exists another
system (which is compatible with the evidence we have) that is simpler than this
one.
Third interpretation: the wave function is merely a variable that we introduce
into the best system to describe the mosaic of local beables. Esfeld and Deckert
(2017) hold this view. On their proposal, only point particles are fundamental, and
we can interpret every other bit of the theory as in the best system. It is an open
question whether there are any principled constraints on the proposal. If there are
no principled constraints, then (in classical physics) we could follow their procedure
and regard the electromagnetic fields as part of the best system. But the electro-
magnetic fields are usually highly complicated. Given the standard view that the
electromagnetic fields are part of the material ontology, tying Humeanism to the
radical view (that allows us to Humeanize the electromagnetic field) is theoretically
costly. Moreover, it seems much more instrumentalist than the original Humean
proposal, which aspires to be realist. Humeanism requires delicate balances between
objectivism and pragmatism, but at least the original Humean proposal has princi-
pled constraints on what goes into the best system and what goes into the mosaic,
and such constraints are generally compatible with scientific practice.
In short, there are prima facie problems facing these versions of wave function
Humeanism. In contrast, the Humean Unification avoids these problems, as we
know that the initial quantum state is simple and unique, and the proposal is fully
realist. Moreover, the Humean Unification has many other theoretical virtues listed
in §5.
We do not think of our view as completely opposed to the views discussed above.
In fact, there is much common ground; our proposal can be seen as friendly extension
to some of the views above. For example, towards the end of her important essay,
Miller (2013) is rightly worried about the potential slippery slope in the strategy she
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proposes, and she suggests we find principled limits to curb over-Humeanization
or the“narcissism” if one tries to “Humeanize” away everything one does not like in
the ontology, including all particles outside one’s brain. Our framework can be seen
as implicitly suggesting such a limit: carry out Humean unification only when you
can show that the best system will not be over-burdened by extra complexity and that
there will be additional fruits of unification beyond solving the original problems.
Moreover, our framework can be combined with Bhogal and Perry (2015)’s proposal
to simplify the supervenient L-state, and with Esfeld and Deckert (2017)’s proposal
to further simplify their “super-Humean” best-system. We leave that to future work.
7 Conclusion
It has been argued that the origin of time asymmetry in our universe lies in its
boundary condition—a low-entropy state now called the Past Hypothesis. In this
paper, we have used the Past Hypothesis to construct a new class of quantum
theories—WIPH-theories. We then showed that they allow the Humeans to use
the best system to specify a simple and unique initial quantum state. This led
to the Humean Unification that combined the origins of quantum entanglement
and time asymmetry. The data in the Initial Projection Hypothesis, with the help
of the density-matrix dynamics, gives rise to both time asymmetry and quantum
phenomena. The result is a new theory with a separable and narratable mosaic as
well as a simpler, less vague, and more unified law system.
Can a non-Humean appreciate our new theory? We think so. The Humean
strategy for regarding the low-entropy initial condition (PH) as nomological does
not sit well with a governing or dynamical conception of laws (although some
non-Humeans would disagree). However, non-Humeans may be less opposed to
our theory. The low-entropy initial condition plays a dynamical role via the initial
projection density matrix and its dynamics. The initial density matrix directly
determines the Bohmian velocity field, the GRW collapse probabilities, and the
Everettian branching structure. Hence, it plays an analogous role as the classical
Hamiltonian function, which can be given a non-Humean interpretation.39
Is our new theory the best theory? Given its empirical equivalence to many
other theories including the quantum Mentaculus, we have to appeal to super-
empirical virtues to settle the question. It is unlikely, however, we will ever be
able to conclusively settle it. What we can do, at this stage, is to build and refine,
to the best of our abilities, different models, theories, and frameworks. Only after
that can we meaningfully compare them side by side as complete packages. In the
meantime, however, we hope the Humean unification outlined above will provoke
new ideas in solving the two problems that we began with.
39Can a quantum state monist appreciate our new theory? We think so. She can at least appreciate
the WIPH-quantum theories without local beables: WIPH-GRW and WIPH-EQM. The crucial step in
the Humean Unification—§4—would not be possible. The quantum state will have to be in the
mosaic. Such theories still retain some novel virtues: they make statistical mechanical probabilities
unnecessary and they are more unified and less vague than their wave-function counterparts.
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